



Mining threats in Namecoin

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Positive Technologies



BREAKING

THE CONSTANT

Namecoin



Alternate DNS registrar based on blockchain

- censor-proof, domains cannot be seized or blackholed

Maintains unofficial [.bit](#) TLD

Resolvers:

- nodes of OpenNIC project
- plugins for Chrome, Firefox and Opera
- [ncdns](#) - opensource project for full-featured authoritative server

Used by:

- Chthronics
- Dimnie
- [RTM](#)
- GandCrab
- Smoke Loader
- Neutrino

«Bitcoin frees money – Namecoin frees DNS»


Agenda



- Bitcoin 201
- How Namecoin works
- Mapping assets in Namecoin
- Takeaways
- [# science ends here](#)
- Bonus track #1
- Bonus track #2

Bitcoin 201

Bitcoin flow



Transaction structure

```
{ "hash": "90b18aa54288ec610d83ff1abe90f10d8ca87fb6411a72b2e56a169fdc9b0219",  
  "ver": 1,  
  "lock_time": 0,  
  "size": 226,  
  "vin_sz": 1,  
  "vout_sz": 2,
```

} Header

```
"in": [  
  { "prev_out": {  
    "hash": "18798f8795ded46c3086f48d5bdabe10e1755524b43912320b81ef547b2f939a",  
    "n": 0 },  
    "scriptSig": "3045022100c1efcad5cdcc0dcf7c2a79d9e1566523af9c7229c78..." }  
],
```


} Inputs


```
"out": [  
  { "value": 4000000000,  
    "scriptPubKey": "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 4b358739fc... OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG"},  
  { "value": 1000000000,  
    "scriptPubkey": "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 55368b388c... OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG"}  
]
```


} Outputs

2 3 OP_ADD 5 OP_EQUAL


How Script works








Operator `ADD` pops the top two items out of the stack and adds them together (3 and 2). Then operator `ADD` pushes the result (5) to the top of the stack.



Constant value 5 is pushed on the top of the stack.



Operator `EQUAL` pops the two top items out of the stack and compares the values (5 and 5) and if they are equal, `EQUAL` pushes `TRUE` of the top of the stack.

2 3 OP_ADD 5 OP_EQUAL



```
{ "hash": "90b18aa54288ec610d83ff1abe90f10d8ca87fb6411a72b2e56a169fdc9b0219",  
  "ver": 1,  
  "lock_time": 0,  
  "size": 226,  
  "vin_sz": 1,  
  "vout_sz": 2,
```

} Header


```
  "in": [  
    { "prev_out": {  
      "hash": "18798f8795ded46c3086f48d5bdabe10e1755524b43912320b81ef547b2f939a",  
      "n": 0 },  
      "scriptSig": "3045022100c1efcad5cdcc0dcf7c2a79d9e1566523af9c7229c78..." }  
  ],
```

} Inputs

```
  "out": [  
    { "value": 4000000000,  
      "scriptPubKey": "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 4b358739fc... OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG"},  
    { "value": 1000000000,  
      "scriptPubkey": "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 55368b388c... OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG"}  
  ]  
}
```

} Outputs

P2PKH



S
T
A
C
K

SCRIPT


```
<sig> <PubK> DUP HASH160 <PubKHash> EQUALVERIFY CHECKSIG
```




EXECUTION
POINTER

<sig>

Execution starts.
Value <sig> is pushed to the top of the stack.



S
T
A
C
K



SCRIPT

```
<sig> <PubK> DUP HASH160 <PubKHash> EQUALVERIFY CHECKSIG
```



DUP operator duplicates the top item in the stack.
The resulting value is pushed on the top of the stack.

S
T
A
C
K




SCRIPT

```
<sig> <PubK> DUP HASH160 <PubKHash> EQUALVERIFY CHECKSIG
```



HASH160 operator hashes the top item in the stack with RIPEMD160 (SHA256 (<PubK>)). The resulting value <PubKHash> is pushed on the top of the stack.



S
T
A
C
K

SCRIPT

```
<sig> <PubK> DUP HASH160 <PubKHash> EQUALVERIFY CHECKSIG
```



EXECUTION
POINTER

<PubK>

<sig>

The EQUALVERIFY operator compares <PubKHash> encumbering the transaction with <PubKHash> calculated from the user's <PubK>. If they match, both are removed and execution continues.

S
T
A
C
K

SCRIPT

```
<sig> <PubK> DUP HASH160 <PubKHash> EQUALVERIFY CHECKSIG
```




EXECUTION
POINTER

TRUE

The CHECKSIG operator checks that the signature `<sig>` matches the public key `<PubK>` and pushes TRUE on the top of the stack if true.

How Namecoin works

Namecoin flow




NAME_NEW



OP_NAMENEW <20 byte hash> OP_2DROP <P2PKH>

Pick a random salt	d5 ee b2 2e e8 11 7f 57
Convert <code>d/phdays</code> to ASCII	64 2f 70 68 64 61 79 73
Concatenate the salt with <code>d/phdays</code> in ASCII	d5 ee b2 2e e8 11 7f 57 64 2f 70 68 64 61 79 73
Hash the result with HASH160 (little endian)	75 46 fa a7 ee d7 b4 9f a0 c7 dd 58 1b f2 a8 4f ff a6 74 36

NAME_FIRSTUPDATE



NAME_UPDATE

OP_NAME_UPDATE <Name> <Value> OP_2DROP OP_DROP <P2PKH>

d/phdays

{"ip":["1.1.1.1"]}

Namecoin Economy



- Chthronic C&C: registered in **2016**, still alive

Name d/pationare (pationare.bit)

Summary

Status	Active
Expires after block	464604 (22089 blocks to go)
Last update	2018-12-07 13:30:11 (block 428604)
Registered since	2016-12-25 13:43:35 (block 319753)

Current value

```
{
  "ns": [
    "a.dnspod.com",
    "b.dnspod.com"
  ]
}
```

Operations

Date/time	Block	Transaction	Operation	Value
2018-12-07 13:30:11	428604	09381e8d8c...	OP_NAME_UPDATE	{"ns":["a.dnspod.com","b.dnspod.com"]}
2018-05-02 21:18:06	396669	f8e8fedb09...	OP_NAME_UPDATE	{"ns":["ANIRBAN.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM","REZA.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM"]}
2018-01-11 20:08:35	379573	6067d7a10e...	OP_NAME_UPDATE	{"ns":["ns1.dnscontrolfff.to","ns2.dnscontrolfff.to"]}

- from **0.0109 NMC** per year
 - 0.00763 USD
 - ~0.5 RUR
- **0.08 USD** per year for daily updates
- compare with **1 USD/year** for **.info**
- or **10 USD/year** for **.com**
- **OPEX** instead of **CAPEX**

Threat mining

Blockchain crawler



Upstream movement



Collects:

- domain names
- IP addresses
- Namecoin addresses managed by threat actor
- unspent coins (UTXO)

Downstream movement looks similar

Heuristics will be discussed later

```
def upstream_movement(tx):
    global names
    global IPs
    global utxo
    global known_addresses

    heuristic_result = upstream_heuristic_test(tx)

    if heuristic_result and heuristic_result.guiding_outs:
        if tx.has_name_op():
            names.add(tx.name_op.name)
            for ip_address in tx.name_op.get_ip():
                IPs.add(ip_address)
        for guiding_out in heuristic_result.guiding_outs:
            known_addresses.add(guiding_out.address)
            tx = namecoin.transactions.find_one({"in.id": guiding_out.id})
            if tx:
                upstream_movement(tx)
            else:
                utxo.add(guiding_out)
```

«Common Change»


«If the output of the transaction is only one ordinary coin, then this coin belongs to the person who owns the input coins.

If at the same time there is a special coin at the output, then it also belongs to the person who owns the input coins.

All addresses used in such a transaction are managed by the same person»


Case #1: First time used address

- Produced by domain creation and update
- Default behavior of native clients – *namecoind*, *namecoin-qt*
- The most common transaction pattern in Namecoin



Case #2: Re-used address

- Corresponds to domain transfer
- In common case doesn't mean that owners are the same, but
- It makes no sense in acquiring a malicious domain, so it is considered as a transfer between the accounts of the same person



«Common Spending»

«If it is known that at least one of the addresses at the input of the transaction is managed by a certain person, then all other addresses at the inputs of this transaction are managed by the same person.

The coins at these inputs belong to the same person»

- Can be used for *downstream movement* only
- Requires data from *Common Change* heuristic (addresses are managed by threat actor)

```
def common_spending(tx):
    result = { "guiding_ins": [] }

    for input in tx.get_ins():
        if input.address in known_addresses:
            return {"guiding_ins": tx.ins.all}

    return {}
```

«Known Address»


«If it is known that the address at the input (output) of the transaction is managed by a certain person, then the coins that put at this address (spent from this address) belong to the same person»

- Can be used for both upstream and downstream movement
- Also requires addresses from *Common Change*

```
def known_address(tx):
    result = { "guiding_outs": [], "guiding_ins": [] }

    for output in tx.get_outs():
        if output.address in known_addresses:
            result["guiding_outs"].append(output)
    for input in tx.get_ins():
        if input.address in known_addresses:
            result["guiding_ins"].append(input)
    return result
```


Dangling inputs and outputs




Takeaways


Takeaways

 <https://github.com/b4bay/rusty-blockparser>

 https://github.com/b4bay/threat_mining_in_namecoin

- RTM, Shifu, Dimnie and GandCrab
- 164 domains
- 277 IP addresses
- 39 UTXO


 b4baysky



Bonus track

May contains assumptions with no strong proof


Dimnie ♥ RTM



managed by [Dimnie](#)
used to create [gosmos.bit](#)

managed by [RTM](#)
used to create [baa1tlbpi.bit](#)

cipingod.bit → 103.208.86.185



cipingod.bit → 103.208.86.185



The screenshot shows the RiskIQ interface for IP 103.208.86.185. The top navigation bar includes the RiskIQ logo, search bar with the IP, and options for Tours, Upgrade, and user profile. Below the navigation bar, there's a header with 'First Seen: 2017-02-16', 'Last Seen: 2019-04-24', 'ASN: Zapple Host LLC', and 'Netblock: 103.208.86.0/23'. There are also buttons for 'Routable', 'Zapple-Host', and 'Categorize'. The main content area is divided into 'HEATMAP' and 'DATA' sections. The 'DATA' section has a row of counts: 5, 1, 6, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0. Below this is a row of tabs: Resolutions, WHOIS, Certificate, Trackers, Components, Host Pairs, OSINT, Hashes, Projects, Cookies. The 'Resolutions' tab is active. On the left, there's a 'FILTERS' sidebar with 'DOMAIN (5/5)' and 'UNIQUE RESOLVE (1/5)'. The 'DOMAIN' list includes: mx.orinase.eu, stackoverflow..., unicc.at, zap.phishfinde..., and zap.phishstor... The 'UNIQUE RESOLVE' list includes 'Show Unique ... 5'. The 'RESOLUTIONS' table has columns: Resolve, First, Last, Source, and Tags. The table shows 5 entries, with 'unicc.at' highlighted in a red box. The 'unicc.at' entry has a 'First' date of 8-01-01 and a 'Last' date of 2018-01-10. There is a 'Download' and 'Copy' button at the top right of the table.

Resolve	First	Last	Source	Tags
zap.phishstorm.center	2018-10-03	2019-04-24	pingly, riskiq	
zap.phishfinder.online	2018-05-16	2018-07-19	riskiq	
stackoverflow.party	2017-06-28	2018-02-17	riskiq	
unicc.at	8-01-01	2018-01-10	pingly, riskiq	
	7-02-16	2017-02-16	riskiq	

cipingod.bit → 103.208.86.185



RISKIQ 103.208.86.185

First Seen: 2017-02-16, Last Seen: 2019-04-24, ASN: Zapple Host LLC, Netblock: 103.208.86.0/23

Resolutions

Resolve	First	Last
zap.phishstorm.center	2018-10-03	2019-04-24
zap.phishfinder.online	2018-05-16	2018-07-19
stackoverflow.party	2017-06-28	2018-02-17
unicc.at	8-01-01	2018-01-10
	7-02-16	2017-02-16

«U.S. Arrests 13, Charges 36 in 'Infraud' Cybercrime Forum Bust»

// Brian Krebs, 08 Feb 2018

UNICC

HOME BUY BILLING ORDERS SUPPORT SETTINGS EXIT

CW Fullz Dumps My Cart

Search dumps

Price	Basename	Card type	Level	Ctype
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

Search result:

BIN	Type	Code	EXP	Country	Bank	Price
408625	PLATINUM CREDIT VISA	201	02/14	TURKEYKEY	DENIZBANK AS	65.00\$
408624	PLATINUM CREDIT VISA	201	02/14	TURKEYKEY	DENIZBANK AS	65.00\$

cipingod.bit → 103.208.86.185

RISKIQ 103.208.86.185

First Seen: 2017-02-16, Last Seen: 2019-04-24, ASN: Zappie Host LLC, Netblock: 103.208.86.0/23

Filters: DOMAIN (5/5)

- mx.orinase.eu 1
- stackoverflow.... 1
- unicc.at 1
- zap.phishfinde... 1
- zap.phishstor... 1

UNIQUE RESOLVE (1/5)

- Show Unique ... 5

RESOLUTIONS

Resolve	First	Last
zap.phishstorm.center	2018-10-03	2019-04-24
zap.phishfinder.online	2018-05-16	2018-07-19
stackoverflow.party	2017-06-28	2018-02-17
unicc.at	8-01-01	2018-01-10
	7-02-16	2017-02-16

«U.S. Arrests 13, Charges 36 in ‘Infraud’ Cybercrime Forum Bust»

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UNICC

Search dumps

Search result:

BIN	Type	Code	EXP	Country	Bank	Price
408625	PLATINUM CREDIT VISA	201	02/14	TURKEYKEY	DENIZBANK AS	65.00\$
408625	PLATINUM CREDIT VISA	201	02/14	TURKEYKEY	DENIZBANK AS	65.00\$

«Thirty-six Defendants Indicted for Alleged Roles in Transnational Criminal Organization Responsible for More than \$530 Million in Losses from Cybercrimes»

// The U.S Department of Justice, 07 Feb 2018

- Svyatoslav Bondarkeno of Ukraine;
- Amjad Ali aka "Amjad Ali Chaudary," aka "RedruMZ," aka "Amjad Chaudary," 35, of Pakistan;
- Roland Patrick N'Djimbi Tchikaya aka "Darker," aka "darkgr.cvv," 37, of France;
- Miroslav Kovacevic aka "Goldjunge," 32, of Serbia;
- Frederick Thomas aka "Mosto," aka "Istunna," aka "Bestssn," 37, of Alabama;
- Gennaro Fioretti aka "DannyLogort," aka "Genny Fioretti," 56, of Italy;
- Edgar Rojas aka "Edgar Andres Viloria Rojas," aka "Guapo," aka "Guapo1988," aka "Onlyshop," 27, of Australia;
- John Telusma aka "John Westley Telusma," aka "Peterelliot," aka "Pete," aka "Pette," 33, of Brooklyn, New York;
- Rami Fawaz aka "Rami Imad Fawaz," aka "Validshop," aka "Th3jd," aka "Zatcher," aka "Darkeyes," 26, of Ivory Coast;
- Muhammad Shiraz aka "Moviestar," aka "Leslie" of Pakistan;
- Jose Gamboa aka "Jose Gamboa-Soto," aka "Rafael Garcia," aka "Rafael101," aka "Memberplex2006" aka "Knowledge," 29, of Los Angeles, California;
- Alexey Klimenko aka "Grandhost," 34, of Ukraine;
- Edward Lavoile aka "Eddie Lavoie," aka "Skizo," aka "Eddy Lavoile," 29, of Canada;
- Anthony Nnamdi Okeaku aka "Aslikei," aka "Aslike," aka "Moneymafia," aka "Shilong," 29, of the United Kingdom;
- Plus Sushil Wilson aka "FDIC," aka "TheRealGuru," aka "TheRealGuruNYC," aka "RealGuru," aka "Poison," aka "infection," aka "infected," 31, of Flushing, New York;
- Muhammad Khan aka "CoolJz," aka "CoolJ," aka "Securerooot," aka "Securerooot1," aka "Securerooot2," aka